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A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE JOCK
TAX: THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
NICK OVERBAY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

State taxation of nonresident professional athletes, commonly known as the
“jock tax,” is foundationally constitutional,1 but the states’ arbitrary and
selective enforcement of the jock tax has and will continue to lead professional
athletes to challenge the constitutionality of the jock tax under the Commerce
Clause, Dormant Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Congress needs to enact
a uniform allocation method for states to follow when taxing nonresident
professional athletes to eliminate the arbitrary and selective enforcement of the
jock tax to ensure states’ application and enforcement of their jock tax is
constitutional. Further, a uniform allocation method would ease the
administrative burden and compliance costs afforded to professional athletes.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause2 generally restricts a state from
levying higher tax rates against nonresidents than it imposes on residents;
however, some taxes are imposed with the sole purpose to collect substantial
amounts of revenue from a specific group of nonresidents.3 This is the primary
reason that states impose the jock tax.4 While some states have constitutional
restrictions on enacting and applying nonresident taxes, there is little constraint
upon state legislatures when they enact a tax on nonresidents, which results in
* Nick Overbay is a J.D. Candidate at Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
and is a candidate for the Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports Law Institute. He
attended the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities, where he earned a B.S. in Sport Management.
1. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60,
75 (1920).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
3. David Schmudde, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Nonresident Citizens, 1999 L.
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 95, 107 (1999).
4. See Michael McCann, Pro Athletes Paid California $216.8 Million in 2012 Income Taxes,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2014), http://www.si.com/mlb/2014/07/21/california-professional-athletes-taxes.
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“offensive and economically counterproductive” nonresident taxation.5
Because nonresidents are unable to vote against state legislators and are
provided little opportunity to be heard in their complaint opposing nonresident
taxes, nonresident “taxpayers’ only recourse against a tax which is laid on them
without the benefit of complaint[] is found in the Constitution of the United
States.”6 Since the existing constitutional protections available for nonresidents
challenging taxes imposed by states against nonresidents have proven
insufficient, and since states’ “taxation of nonresidents [has] become[]
excessive[,] . . . it is imperative that new protections be developed, or the current
constitutional analyses be amended.”7
This Comment examines the constitutional validity of the jock tax and
analyzes the reasons needed for congressional intervention to impose a uniform
allocation method for states that levy a jock tax. Part II discusses the history
and background of states taxing nonresidents. Part III examines the history of
the jock tax, the states’ benefits from levying the jock tax, and the application
methods used to determine the amount of tax liability owed to the visiting state
by a nonresident professional athlete. Part IV highlights the states’ targeted and
selective enforcement, explains the constitutional provisions involved with the
enforcement of the jock tax, and discusess recent federal proposals to ease the
burden of nonresident taxation. Part V analyzes the significance of two Ohio
Supreme Court cases, and how the rulings will affect the future application and
enforcement of the jock tax. Finally, Part VI illustrates how a uniform approach
would alleviate the complexities and controversies involved with the states’
application and enforcement of the jock tax.
II.

THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF STATES TAXING NONRESIDENTS

In 1920, two cases were decided by the Supreme Court that firmly
established the states’ ability to tax nonresidents on income earned and derived
from sources within their respective state.8 In the first case, Shaffer v. Carter,9
an Illinois resident received income from properties owned in Oklahoma.10
Oklahoma imposed taxes against the entire net income derived from the
properties, which the taxpayer challenged on constitutional grounds.11 The
5. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 97.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 97–98.
8. Leslie A. Ringle, State and Local Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW.
J. 169, 171 (1995).
9. 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
10. Id. at 45.
11. Id. at 46.
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taxpayer asserted the tax imposed by Oklahoma violated due process, denied
nonresidents equal protection, burdened interstate commerce, and denied
nonresidents of the privileges and immunities of Oklahoma citizens.12
Addressing the due process claim, the Court emphasized its history of
decisions that recognized “[t]he rights of the several States to exercise the
widest liberty with respect to the imposition of internal taxes.”13 Further
illustrating that due process was not violated, the Court stated:
[J]ust as a State may impose general income taxes upon its own
citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its control,
it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty of like
character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes
accruing to non[]residents from their property or business
within the State, or their occupations carried on therein;
enforcing payment, so far as it can, by the exercise of a just
control over persons and property within its borders.14
Relying on the “more onerous” language, the Court also found that neither
the Equal Protection Clause nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
violated by the tax imposed.15 Because Oklahoma had assumed no power to tax
nonresidents’ income derived outside its jurisdiction, the tax was not more
onerous in its effect as compared to Oklahoma residents.16 Thus, the tax
assessed by Oklahoma was lawful because the Constitution “entitles [the
taxpayer] to the privileges and immunities of a citizen, but no more; not to an
entire immunity from taxation, nor to any preferential treatment as compared
with resident citizens. It protects him against discriminatory taxation, but gives
him no right to be favored by discrimination or exemption.”17
Similarly, in Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.,18 a nonresident
corporation that conducted business in New York raised the constitutional
claims of due process violations, privileges and immunities violations, interstate
commerce clause violations, impairment of the obligation of contracts claims,
and equal protection violations against the State of New York because the
corporation, under New York income tax laws, was required to withhold the
12. Id.
13. Id. at 51.
14. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
15. See id. at 53, 55–56.
16. See id. at 53, 56–57.
17. Id. at 53.
18. 252 U.S. 60 (1920).

OVERBAY 27.1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

220

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/19/2016 6:04 PM

[Vol. 27:1

taxes of its employees that were residents of Connecticut or New Jersey.19
Relying on the propositions established in Shaffer, the Court noted that the State
of New York has jurisdiction to assess a tax on “the incomes of non[]residents
arising from any business, trade, profession, or occupation carried on within its
borders . . . and that such a tax, so enforced, does not violate the due process of
law provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.”20 However, there are more
constitutional claims available for nonresident professional athletes that
challenge a state’s jock tax; those claims are analyzed in Part IV(F) of this Comment. First, a background of the jock tax is provided to demonstrate why states
began implementing such a tax and the complexities involved with applying and
enforcing the jock tax.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE JOCK TAX
The jock tax is defined as “[t]he practice of making professional athletes
pay to play, by reason of pro-rata application and enforcement of state and local
income tax statutes upon non[]resident professional athletes who engage in
athletic contests within the jurisdiction.”21 However, the jock tax is not limited
to just the athletes, but is also imposed on the coaches, trainers, and team
officials.22 Thus, the jock tax is a source-based tax rather than a resident-based
tax23 because it requires professional athletes and other team members to pay
income taxes in every city and state where they earn income.24 Though it is well
established that states can tax nonresidents that have a sufficient nexus with that
state,25 issues arise when states unfairly tax nonresidents.26
The first instance of a nonresident professional athlete being specifically
targeted by state tax law was found in a 1976 appeal brought by former San
Diego Chargers punter, Dennis Partee, against the State of California
challenging the amount of taxes he owed to California for the year 1968.27
19. Id. at 72, 74–75.
20. Id. at 75.
21. Kenneth H. Ryesky, Devil’s Dictionary of Taxation, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 54, 66 (2005).
22. See Elizabeth C. Ekmekjian et al., The Jock Tax Contest: Professional Athletes vs. the States –
Background and Current Developments, 20 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 19, 20 (2004).
23. Steven Pahuskin, Heads Up! Recent Federal and State Attempts to Address Nonresident Income
Taxation Perpetuate Selective Enforcement and Unfairness of the “Jock Tax,” 64 TAX LAW. 961, 964
(2011).
24. Jock Taxes, TAX FOUND., http://taxfoundation.org/tax-topics/jock-taxes (last visited Dec. 15,
2016).
25. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920); see also Travis, 252 U.S. at 77.
26. See Schmudde, supra note 3, at 98.
27. What Is the “Jock Tax”?, TAXABALL, http://www.taxaball.com/what-is-the-jock-tax.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2016).
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However, with the escalation of professional athletes’ salaries in the 1980s,
states began to pursue and tax nonresident professional athletes more heavily.28
The jock tax received more publicity and became popular in 1991 after the
Chicago Bulls defeated the Los Angeles Lakers in the National Basketball
Association (NBA) Finals.29 California subjected the players on the Chicago
Bulls’ roster to pay state income tax against the salary earned for the time spent
in California during the entire 1990-91 NBA season.30
In response, Illinois enacted its own version of the jock tax, but only levied
the tax against visiting professional athletes who played for teams whose home
state taxed professional athletes from Illinois.31 Illinois’s reciprocal taxing
measure was designed to pressure states to eliminate the jock tax, but it instead
created an inconsistent application.32 Thus, the states’ arbitrary enforcement
and application of the jock tax was born.
“Today, all [twenty] states with professional sports franchises and state
income taxes have a jock tax.”33 The states excluded due to not having a state
income tax are Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.34 Additionally,
nine cities home to a professional sports franchise levy their own jock tax, which
includes “visiting players and anyone who accompanies the team.”35
A. The Benefits Provided to States by Implementing the Jock Tax
The ease of identifying a professional athlete’s schedule has caused states
to increase their enforcement efforts of the jock tax,36 and athletes’ high salaries
have created a substantial amount of tax revenue for states.37 Typically, the
funds received are put into general state coffers;38 however, some states use the
28. Richard R. DiFrischia, State and Local Taxation of Nonresident Athletes, 18 J. ST. TAX’N 120,
121 (2000).
29. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 965.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Elizabeth C. Ekmekjian, The Jock Tax: State and Local Income Taxation of Professional
Athletes, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 229, 235–37 (1994).
33. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 965.
34. John DiMascio, The “Jock Tax”: Fair Play or Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 68 U. PITT. L. REV.
953, 958 (2007).
35. Martin J. Greenberg, Jock Tax, GREENBERG L. OFF.: SPORT$BIZ (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www.greenberglawoffice.com/jock-tax.
36. Alan Pogroszewski, When Is a CPA as Important as Your ERA? A Comprehensive Evaluation
and Examination of State Tax Issues on Professional Athletes, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 395, 395
(2009).
37. See Luke Anderson, Taxing the Professional Athlete, EMPLOYER GROUP (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.theemployergroup.com/taxing-professional-athlete.
38.
Mary Pilon,
The
Jock-Tax
Man, NEW YORKER (Apr.
10,
2015),
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revenue received from the taxation of nonresident professional athletes to fund
state-specific projects and stadiums.39 Although recently repealed,40 Tennessee
used the revenue received from its jock tax to support and fund the venues in
which athletes played.41 Further, some state legislatures turn to nonresident
sources of income in the form of taxes when attempting to fund the construction
of new professional sport stadiums.42 For example, in 2012, Wisconsin captured
$10.7 million in revenue from NBA athletes.43 Thus, with professional athletes’
income taxes expected to increase, especially NBA athletes because of the
league’s revenue growth, the revenue received by Wisconsin from taxing
nonresident professional athletes would support the $150 million state general
obligation bonding for the Milwaukee Bucks’ new arena.44 Despite the current
controversies surrounding the jock tax, the revenue received by the states is too
substantial for the states not to enforce the taxation of nonresident professional
athletes.
B. Application of the Jock Tax
There are two important concepts to understanding the states’ practice of
taxing nonresident professional athletes. First, a state can tax income earned by
nonresidents within its jurisdiction, even though these nonresidents have no
representation within that state.45 Second, although an administrative burden
exists on levying nonresident income taxation against sporadic visitors,
professional athletes are easy targets because of their public schedules and their
large salaries, creating an economic benefit that outweighs the administrative
burden.46 These two concepts are the foundation for the jock tax’s existence.47
To apply the first concept, it must be understood what portion of a
professional athlete’s income is subject to the jock tax, and the allocation
methods used to collect it. The second concept requires a constitutional analysis
to examine the arbitrary and targeted enforcement used by the states in applying
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-jock-tax-man.
39. See Schmudde, supra note 3, at 102.
40. Chris Stephens, Tennessee Jock Tax Finally Sacked, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/tennessee-jock-tax-finally-sacked.
41. Pilon, supra note 38.
42. Id.
43. Don Walker & Patrick Marley, ‘Jock’ Taxes Paid by Bucks Would Cover $150 Million Arena
Loan, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/jocktaxes-paid-by-bucks-would-cover-150-million-arena-loan-b99390809z1-282721001.html.
44. Id.
45. DiMascio, supra note 34, at 955.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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the jock tax.
1. Income Subject to the Jock Tax
The Internal Revenue Code defines gross income broadly to include “all
income from whatever source derived.”48 A “professional athlete’s [gross
income] portfolio includes wages, signing bonuses, performance bonuses, prize
money, endorsements, royalties, license fees, personal appearance fees, gifts,
and imputed interest on interest free loans.”49 However, cities and states levy
the jock tax on a professional athlete’s personal service income.50 A
professional athlete’s personal service income normally includes “wages,
performance bonuses, and deferred compensation earned while within the
taxing jurisdiction.”51 Most states exclude a professional athlete’s signing
bonus from the athlete’s tax base because it is not considered personal service,
but rather compensation for contracting with a team.52 Additionally,
endorsement deals and public appearances are only taxed by an athlete’s home
state.53
An athlete’s personal service income “must be apportioned to the various
sources where it is earned.”54 This apportionment requirement “is based on the
principal that gross income for city and state tax purposes includes only that
income from sources within the jurisdiction.”55 This means a professional
athlete must actually perform services within a taxing jurisdiction to incur tax
liability.56
2. Allocation Methods Used To Apportion an Athlete’s Income
Traditionally, states have used two methods to apportion a professional
athlete’s income: the “duty-days” method and the “games-played” method.57
Steps have been taken to alleviate the varying allocation methods used by the
states. These steps are further discussed in Part V of this Comment.
48. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2016); JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (17th ed. 2013).
49. Ekmekjian, supra note 32, at 231.
50. Id. at 237.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Anderson, supra note 37.
54. Ekmekjian, supra note 32, at 238.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Jeffrey L. Krasney, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW.
J. 127, 136 (1995).
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Nonetheless, a brief description of both the duty-days method and the
games-played method will be given.
i.

Duty-Days Method

The majority of states use the duty-days method.58 The duty-days method
“allocates income using a ratio of the number of days an athlete is present in the
taxing jurisdiction to the total number of days . . . that the athlete is required to
work.”59 The duty-days method includes practices and meeting days.60 The
duty-days method is “calculated as the percentage of duty-days spent in the
respective state, compared to the total duty-days that athlete had that tax year,
multiplied by the player’s salary.”61 Its formula is as follows:
Income Earned in State X = Yearly Salary × (Duty-Days Spent in State X
÷ Total Duty-Days)62
For example, assume LeBron James spends eight duty-days in California,
and there are 200 duty-days in a NBA season. James’ yearly salary is
approximately $33 million.63 When James plays in California, James is liable
for California’s jock tax. California takes the duty-days James spends in
California (8 days) and divides by the number of duty-days in the season (200
days). California then takes the percentage of duty-days spent within its
jurisdiction (4%) and multiplies it by James’ total NBA income ($33M) to
calculate the portion of James’ income attributable to California ($1.32M).
California then multiplies James’ income earned in California by its income tax
rate (13.3%) to arrive at James’ jock tax bill of $175,560.
ii.

Games-Played Method

Alternatively, the games-played method is “based on the ratio of
games-played in a particular jurisdiction to the total games-played.”64 The
games-played method excludes “practice, training, and preseason days.”65 Its

58. Greenberg, supra note 35.
59. Krasney, supra note 57, at 136.
60. Id.
61. What Is the “Jock Tax”?, supra note 27.
62. Id.
63. LeBron James Contract, Salary Cap Details & Breakdowns, SPOTRAC, http://www.
spotrac.com/nba/cleveland-cavaliers/lebron-james/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).
64. Krasney, supra note 57, at 137.
65. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 965.
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formula is as follows:
Income Earned in State X = Yearly Salary × (Games-Played in State X ÷
Total Games)
For example, the City of Cleveland utilizes the games-played method to
calculate the jock tax owed by professional athletes. The Los Angeles Lakers
played one game in Cleveland during the 2015-16 NBA season.66 Kobe
Bryant’s salary for the 2015-16 NBA season was $25 million.67 To calculate
Bryant’s jock tax bill for the City of Cleveland, Cleveland takes the total number
of games played within its jurisdiction (1 game) and divides it by the total
number of games in that NBA season (82 games). Cleveland then takes this
percentage (1.2195122%) and multiplies it by Bryant’s total income ($25M) to
calculate the portion of Bryant’s income attributable to Cleveland ($304,878).
Cleveland then multiples this attributable income by its income tax rate of 2%
to reach Bryant’s jock tax bill of $6,097.56 owed to the City of Cleveland.
Furthermore, this amount would then be added to the amount Bryant owes the
State of Ohio, which uses the duty-days method.
IV. SELECTIVE AND TARGETED ENFORCEMENT OF NONRESIDENT TAXATION
Each of the fifty states has the sovereignty to create and establish its own
taxing system.68 As such, the nonresident, interstate taxpayer faces a significant
burden.69 States are extremely aggressive in taxing nonresidents, which results
in states treating nonresidents worse than residents.70 Two main issues must be
decided to determine “whether a statute taxing nonresidents violates
constitutional protections.”71 “First, does the [C]onstitution require equal
treatment of nonresidents and residents? Second, how is equal treatment
defined?”72 The equal treatment obligation is found in any of these three

66. Los Angeles Lakers 2016
Schedule – Lakers Home and Away, ESPN,
http://www.espn.com/nba/team/schedule/_/name/LAL/year/2016/seasontype/2 (last visited Dec. 15,
2016).
67. Kobe Bryant Contract, Salary Cap Details & Breakdowns, SPOTRAC, http://www.
spotrac.com/nba/los-angeles-lakers/kobe-bryant/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).
68. Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171,
171 (1997).
69. Id.
70. See Schmudde, supra note 3, at 111.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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constitutional provisions: the Commerce Clause;73 the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment;74 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.75
All three clauses have an effect on the states’ application and enforcement of
the jock tax. Furthermore, potential challenges of a state’s jock tax exist under
the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brief descriptions of each constitutional provision will be
provided to illustrate the complexities involved with the jock tax. Further,
potential challenges professional athletes can bring against the application of
the jock tax will be explored.
A. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that states may not discriminate against or
excessively burden interstate commerce.76 As applied to taxation, “courts have
interpreted this to mean that a state may not give advantages to its own citizens
at the expense of non[]citizens.”77 “However, not all [state] discrimination
against [nonresidents] will be found to be unconstitutional.”78 If a sufficient
rationale exists for a state’s enactment of a discriminatory tax against
nonresidents, with minimal burden placed on nonresidents, the tax is held to be
constitutional.79 If nonresident taxpayers receive a tax credit from their home
state for taxes paid to other states, no burden exists on those nonresident
taxpayers.80 “The Commerce Clause is used to prohibit any state from
interfering with commerce or impeding the operation of businesses on an
interstate basis.”81 To escape this prohibition, a state’s rationale for a
nonresident tax is that “the tax only increases a burden on a [nonresident]
choosing to do business within the state. It does not impose any restriction or
burden on the [nonresident] doing business in any other state.”82 Additionally,
a nonresident tax is limited to the business conducted within the state’s
jurisdiction; therefore, “the tax is only imposed on ‘intrastate commerce,’ not
‘interstate commerce.’”83
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
77. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 111.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 112.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,84 the Supreme Court “provided an
analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of a state tax under
the Commerce Clause.”85 For a state tax to be valid and not violate the
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court held that a state tax be “applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, fairly apportioned,
non-discriminatory against interstate commerce, and fairly related to the
services provided by the State.”86 Prongs two, three, and four will not be
addressed because each prong requires a separate, independent analysis for each
state’s jock tax.
The first prong of the provided framework, “substantial nexus,” has two
sub-parts for state tax jurisdictions: “(1) nexus with the taxpayer and (2) nexus
with the income, transaction, activity, or property sought to be taxed.”87
However, there is uncertainty about the nexus required under the Commerce
Clause.88 While the Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota89 addressed
whether the physical presence by the taxpayer is the nexus needed for state sales
and use tax, a taxpayer’s economic presence may be sufficient for nonresident
income taxation.90 State courts are divided on the issue of which standard to
apply, and the Supreme Court has yet to answer the question because “the
Supreme Court’s exploration of the constitutional limits of income tax
jurisdiction has been stymied by Congress’s enactment of legislation as an
affirmative exercise of its Commerce Clause powers.”91 However, it is a
reasonable inference that the nexus must be a “physical presence” based on the
ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court in Saturday v. Cleveland Board of Review,92
a case that is further discussed in Part VI of this Comment. Nonetheless, states
are still divided on which nexus applies to the taxation of nonresident
professional athletes.
The states’ division necessitates congressional
intervention to establish which nexus standard applies to states’ jock tax
application to provide uniformity in the enforcement of the jock tax.

84. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
85. Alan Pogroszewski & Kari A. Smoker, Is Tennessee’s Version of the “Jock Tax”
Unconstitutional?, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 415, 421 (2013).
86. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279.
87. Pogroszewski & Smoker, supra note 85, at 422.
88. See id.
89. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
90. Pogroszewski & Smoker, supra note 85, at 422.
91. Id. at 422 n.44.
92. 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015).

OVERBAY 27.1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

228

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/19/2016 6:04 PM

[Vol. 27:1

B. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . prohibits
states from denying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”93 However, the Equal Protection Clause does not protect against all
discrimination in tax statutes.94 “It requires that any tax which discriminates
against nonresidents be based upon a rational basis and not resort to arbitrary
classifications.”95 Typically, courts use three standards of review to analyze
laws under the Equal Protection Clause: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate
scrutiny; and (3) rational basis. Strict scrutiny applies to “suspect
classifications” such as race and religion.96 To pass strict scrutiny, the law must
further a “compelling governmental interest,” and must be narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.97 Intermediate scrutiny is used in equal protection
challenges to gender classifications.98 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the law
must further an “important government interest” by means substantially related
to that interest.99 Rational basis is used when a law does not involve any
fundamental rights or a suspect classification.100 To pass rational basis, the law
must be “rationally related” to a “legitimate government interest.”101
Under the Equal Protection Clause, rational basis applies to an analysis of
the jock tax because residency is not a “suspect classification.”102 Additionally,
because it is difficult to establish professional athletes as a “suspect class,”103
courts will find a state’s jock tax constitutional if it has a “rational basis” to a
“legitimate state purpose.”104 Here, the rational basis for the jock tax is to
generate revenue from nonresident professional athletes to help offset the costs
associated with hosting a professional sporting event.

93. Equal Protection, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection (last
visited Dec. 15, 2016).
94. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 113.
95. Id.
96. Equal Protection, supra note 93.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Joel Michael, Constitutional Restrictions on Taxation of Nonresidents, MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/clssnonr.pdf (last visited Dec. 15,
2016).
103. Elaine S. Povich, Superstar Athletes Pay Big Jock Taxes in Some States, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct.
26, 2014), http://govexec.com/state-local/2014/10/state-jock-taxes/97412/.
104. Equal Protection, supra note 93.
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C. Privileges and Immunities Clause
There are two clauses within the United States Constitution that protect the
privileges and immunities of citizens. Article IV, Section 2 provides, “[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.”105 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides, “[n]o [s]tate shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”106 Rather than the
Equal Protection Clause, it is the Privileges and Immunities Clause that protects
against discriminatory taxation levied against nonresidents.107 “The ‘fairness’
which nonresident taxpayers must receive from other states is guaranteed by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”108 This clause must provide “the
constitutional guarantee of fairness” in states’ treatment of nonresidents because
without that guarantee, nonresidents would be “fair game” for the taxing state,
and such discriminatory taxation would lead to “border wars” between the
states.109 An example of such border wars is illustrated by the action taken by
the State of Illinois after California taxed the visiting members of the Chicago
Bulls in 1991.
D. Dormant Commerce Clause
Pursuant to the Dormant Commerce Clause, states are not allowed to
“discriminate against or burden the flow of interstate commerce.”110 “In the
absence of congressional legislation regarding an area of commerce, the
Supreme Court enforces the anti-economic protectionism purpose behind the
Commerce Clause by striking down state discrimination against interstate
commerce through the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine.”111 In a recent
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Maryland tax statutes that imposed a tax
on the income of Maryland residents earned outside of the state’s jurisdiction
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because Maryland did not offer its
residents a full tax credit against the income taxes they paid to other states.112
Therefore, if a professional athlete’s home state disallows a full tax credit for

105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 115.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National Economy, 8 FLA. TAX
REV. 885, 897 (2008).
111. Id. at 899.
112. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
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the income taxes paid to other states, and the home state imposes a tax on 100%
of the professional athlete’s income, that state is in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
E. Due Process Clause
Another limitation on the states’ ability to tax is found in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause mandates that
no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”113 Since state taxation is a deprivation of property, it is subject
to the Due Process Clause. There are two principles that must be satisfied before
a state can impose a tax upon a nonresident on income generated in interstate
commerce.114 In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established
that before a state can enact a tax, there must be “some minimum connection[]
between a state and the person, property[,] or transaction it seeks to tax.”115
Further, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, the Supreme Court ruled
that a tax must have “a rational relationship between the income attributed to
the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.”116
Additionally, under the Due Process Clause, “a state is prohibited from the
taxing, on an unapportioned basis, [of] property that was taxable in other states
on an apportioned basis, otherwise taxation by two or more states of the same
property would be unconstitutional.”117 This act is commonly known as “double
taxation.” Due process can be violated by the jock tax with the critical question
being “whether the home state may tax all of the compensation that a
nonresident athlete earns from his professional sports services, including
income tax earned from services performed in other states.”118 Therefore, if a
professional athlete’s home state disallows a full tax credit for the income taxes
paid to other states, and the home state imposes a tax on 100% of the
professional athlete’s income, that state is in violation of the Due Process
Clause.

113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341 (1954); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436–37 (1980).
115. Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 345.
116. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 437.
117. N. Anna Shaheen & Brent C. Estes, The Tax Collector Comes Knocking: An Evaluation of the
State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes and the Role of Congress, 15 J. LEGAL
ETHICAL REG. ISSUES 131, 137 (2012).
118. Id.
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F. Professional Athletes’ Potential Challenges
“Unfair taxation should be broadly defined to include any tax which has the
practical effect of being targeted predominately at nonresidents.”119 There are
three remedies available to nonresident professional athletes that are subject to
a possible unfair jock tax.120 Professional athletes can:
(1) look to the legislature to reduce or eliminate the tax; (2)
bring suit in the hope that the judiciary will provide the
protection of the equal protection clause and the privileges and
immunities clause; and (3) demonstrate to the taxing state that
nonresident taxation actually causes economic harm to the
taxing state.121
Generally, state courts have been the improper venue for a nonresident
taxpayer to seek redress against what is perceived as an unfair tax because “state
courts have given very little protection to nonresidents.”122 However,
nonresident professional athletes can find redress in federal courts because
federal courts will “reinforce the constitutional provisions guaranteeing fair
treatment by a state of the citizens of another state.”123 Further, federal courts
can deter the states’ aggressive nature of levying taxes against nonresidents.124
Additionally, the remedy of looking to the legislature is generally
ineffective unless the nonresident group is substantial enough to pressure
legislators.125 Nonresident professional athletes are an exception to this
generality. As previously mentioned, the State of Tennessee recently repealed
its version of the jock tax because it was “constitutionally suspect.”126 The lead
sponsor of the bill, Republican David Alexander,127 believed Tennessee’s jock
tax to be unconstitutional because it exempted NFL athletes while National
Hockey League (NHL) and NBA athletes were subjected to the tax.128
However, even the repeal has drawn criticism because at the time the repeal
119. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 108.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 108–09.
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 109.
126. Stephens, supra note 40.
127. Nate Raunrau, Tennessee Legislature Abolishes Jock Tax, TENNESSEAN (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2014/04/07/tennessee-house-abolishes-jock-tax/7440595/.
128. Stephens, supra note 40.
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took effect, NHL players were immediately exempted, but Tennessee still
subjected NBA players to the tax for an additional two years.129 This fact can
be contributed to the Memphis Grizzlies pressuring the Tennessee legislature
because the revenue received from the tax went directly to the team to assist
with the funding of arena upgrades and the hosting of additional events besides
basketball games.130
Lastly, the third remedy, showing economic harm, is likely to be
unsuccessful for professional athletes because of the substantial amount of
revenue each state pulls in from their enforcement of the jock tax. For economic
harm to be shown, “the tax must be higher than what is normally expected, and
it must cause a change in consumer’s behavior to the extent that a local group
becomes interested and to an extent that the legislature takes action.”131
Typically, this remedy is utilized when a substantial tax is placed on hotel rooms
or rental cars.132 Also, because every state’s jock tax rate must be equivalent to
its resident income tax rate, professional athletes will be unlikely to satisfy this
remedy.
V.

PAST EFFORTS TO RESOLVE NONRESIDENT TAXATION ISSUES

States have begun to broadly apply nonresident income tax laws, which has
led to increased compliance costs, complexity, and administrative difficulties.133
As a result, Congress and the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) have
introduced legislation to ameliorate these difficulties; however, both Congress
and the MTC explicitly exclude athletes from their scope, “thereby perpetuating
an unjust selective enforcement of nonresident income taxes on athletes.”134
The Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act of 2015 was
introduced by Republican Mark Bishop, but has yet to be passed by the House
of Representatives and the Senate.135 The purpose of this bill is to “limit the
authority of States to tax certain income of employees for employment duties
performed in other States.”136 Section 2(a)(2) of the bill preempts states from
taxing nonresident employees that work within the state for less than thirty days

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 109.
132. See id.
133. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 970.
134. Id.
135. Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act of 2015, H.R. 2315, 114th Cong.
(2015).
136. Id.
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in a single year.137 However, athletes are not covered under this bill.138 Section
2(d)(2) defines “employee,” but explicitly excludes “a professional athlete,
professional entertainer, or certain public figures.”139 Thus, rather than solving
the states’ targeted enforcement, compliance burdens, and unfairness of the jock
tax, this action by Congress only enhances these controversies. If this bill were
to be passed, “Congress would be condoning states’ continued practice of
selective enforcement against athletes. Such selective enforcement violates a
fundamental principle of taxation: neutrality.”140 Furthermore, the MTC also
excluded “professional athletes and members of a professional athletic team”
from its twenty-day de minimis model statute that it had recommended to
“alleviate the burdens of nonresident taxation.”141
However, the most significant effort to address and alleviate issues involved
with the taxation of nonresident professional athletes came from the Federation
of Tax Administrators (FTA).142 Sport franchises and players’ associations
requested the FTA to intervene and address the differing methods used because
of the complications and costs of complying with each state’s independent
allocation method.143 In 1994, the FTA issued a report entitled State Income
Taxation of Nonresident Professional Team Athletes: A Uniform Approach.144
The report presented numerous issues faced by athletes, sport franchises, and
state administrators including:
(1) the compliance burden of filing numerous state and local
tax returns; (2) inconsistent rules to govern apportionment of
an athlete[’]s wages which may lead to multiple taxation of the
same earnings; (3) burdens due to withholding and reporting
requirements for teams; and (4) administering and enforcing
compliance by state administrators and the treatment of athletes
as compared to other taxpayers.145
To resolve these issues, the FTA reviewed four alternatives: (1) Uniform
Apportionment Formula; (2) Home State Apportionment; (3) Base State Model;
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 971.
141. Id.
142. See Ekmekjian et al., supra note 22, at 23.
143. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 966.
144. Ekmekjian et al., supra note 22, at 23.
145. Id. at 24.
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and (4) Partnership Model.146 The Uniform Apportionment Formula would
“provide for a consistent approach to the division of income by all states taxing
nonresident team members.”147 Home State Apportionment would allow “team
members [to] allocate income from the playing of all games to the state in which
the team played its home games or otherwise maintained its primary
facilities.”148 The Base State Model would allow professional athletes to satisfy
tax return filings by filing a single tax return “with the state in which the team
was domiciled, which state would, in turn, be responsible for providing the
relevant information and funds to all other states involved.”149 The Partnership
Model would allow the tax return filings to “be satisfied through a composite or
consolidated return filed on behalf of all eligible team members.”150
The FTA requested each state uniformly adopt the duty-days method to
achieve “the fair treatment of the taxpayer, consistent taxation of the income,
and a substantial reduction in difficulties involved in complying with state tax
laws.”151 Ultimately, all states agreed to adopt the duty-days method152 with
Massachusetts being the last state to adopt the duty-days method in 2002.153
However, this proposal only applied to the states’ jock tax. Cities were still able
to implement their own allocation method when enforcing their jock tax.
Nonetheless, two cases recently decided by the Ohio Supreme Court could have
significant ramifications for establishing a uniform allocation method.
VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF HILLENMEYER V. CLEVELAND BOARD OF REVIEW AND
SATURDAY V. CLEVELAND BOARD OF REVIEW
The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided, in Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland
Board of Review154 and Saturday v. Cleveland Board of Review,155 that
Cleveland’s version of the jock tax “violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution since it imposes an extraterritorial tax in violation of this clause.”156
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting JAMES W. WETZLER, FEDERATIONN OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, STATE INCOME
TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT PROFESSIONAL TEAM ATHLETES: A UNIFORM APPROACH 2 (1994)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 966 (quoting JAMES W. WETZLER, FEDERATION OF TAX
ADMINISTRATORS, supra note 147, at 3) (alteration in original).
152. Id.
153. Ekmekjian et al., supra note 22, at 24.
154. 41 N.E.3d 1164 (Ohio 2015).
155. 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015).
156. Brian Gallagher, Are States Taking ‘Jock Tax’ Too Far?, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/694890/are-states-taking-jock-tax-too-far.
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In its Hillenmeyer opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,
Due process requires an allocation that reasonably
associates the amount of compensation taxed with work the
taxpayer performed within the city . . . . By using the
games-played method, Cleveland has reached extraterritorially,
beyond its power to tax . . . . The games-played method reaches
income for work that was performed outside of Cleveland, and
thus Cleveland’s income tax violates due process as applied to
NFL players.157
Under Cleveland’s games-played approach, a visiting football player who
plays one game in Cleveland out of a twenty-game schedule would have 5% of
his income allocated to Cleveland.158 However, under the duty-days method,
the amount of income allocated to Cleveland for the same athlete would have
been only slightly more than 1%.159 The court stated “the duty-days method
properly includes as taxable income only that compensation earned in Cleveland
by accounting for all the work for which an NFL player . . . is paid, rather than
merely the football games he plays each year.”160 The court reiterated this point
in its Saturday opinion when it stated “NFL players are contractually employed
to provide services to their employers . . . including mandatory mini-camps, the
official preseason training camp, meetings, [and] practice sessions.”161
Furthermore, in its Saturday opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court not only
addressed the games-played method used by the City of Cleveland, but also
addressed the issue of Saturday being taxed despite his lack of physical presence
in Cleveland.162 The court reiterated its proposition in Hillenmeyer that
Cleveland’s use of the games-played method did not properly tax the income
attributable to the work performed in Cleveland because it only considered
games as employment services.163 The court determined that because Saturday,
in performing rehabilitation for an injury, was engaged in employment services
in Indianapolis and was not physically present in Cleveland for the game,
Cleveland had no jurisdiction to tax Saturday for the income he earned on that
day. However, as previously mentioned in Part IV(A), under the Commerce
157. Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 1176.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1177.
161. Saturday v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 33 N.E.3d 46, 50 (Ohio 2015).
162. See id. at 5051.
163. Id.
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Clause, states are split on which nexus applies when taxing nonresident
professional athletes.
Nevertheless, the City of Cleveland has appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court
contending that no court has ever held the games-played allocation method
unconstitutional on any grounds.164 Because the Supreme Court rejected the
City of Cleveland’s request for an appeal, the duty-days method is utilized by
all states and cities to levy the jock tax. This exemplifies another reason why
congressional intervention is needed. Rather than having uncertainty in which
allocation method applies, Congress should enact legislation that requires every
state and city to implement the duty-days method.
VII. THE NEED FOR CONGRESS INTERVENTION TO CREATE UNIFORMITY
“[T]he multitude of tax systems amounts to a drag on interstate trade almost
as debilitating as the border restrictions our federal system was originally
designed to prevent.”165 Achieving a uniform allocation method for the jock tax
would “reduce the states’ administrative costs and [professional athletes’]
compliance costs.”166 Additionally, a uniform allocation method would
eliminate the risk of double taxation on professional athletes’ income, promote
efficiency, and decrease planning costs.167 Furthermore, a uniform allocation
method would eliminate litigation and potential challenges by professional
athletes.168
A uniform allocation method can be achieved in one of three ways: “(1) by
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the [D]ormant Commerce
Clause; (2) by the voluntary, joint action of the states; or (3) by congressional
action.”169 However, Supreme Court precedent has established that it is “neither
willing nor able to mandate uniformity in state and local taxation.”170 Thus, if
a uniform allocation method is to be reached for jock tax enforcement, then “it
must be through the voluntary, joint action of the states or congressional
action.”171

164. Cleveland Appeals ‘Jock Tax’ Ruling to Supreme Court, ESPN (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.espn.com/moresports/story/_/id/13827207/cleveland-appeals-jock-tax-ruling-supremecourt. Also, Supreme Court declined to hear appeal.
165. Moore, supra note 68, at 179 (quoting Gordon D. Henderson, What We Can Do About What’s
Wrong with the Tax Law, 49 TAX NOTES 1349, 1352 (1990)) (alteration in original).
166. Id. at 179.
167. See id. at 179–80.
168. Id. at 180.
169. Id. at 171.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Even though the recommendation issued by the FTA succeeded in states
agreeing to adopt the duty-days allocation method, concerns and controversies
still exist as to the application of the duty-days method because “no two states
calculate their jock tax exactly alike.”172 Though the states agree on using the
duty-days method, and while state case precedent exists,173 the states do not
agree on what constitutes a “duty-day.”174 While some jurisdictions treat
practices and organized team activities as duty-days, other states do not.175 This
creates an administrative nightmare for athletes in determining what their tax
liability is for every state they visit. Thus, unless the states voluntarily agree on
what to include as a duty-day, administrative complications and sufficient
compliance costs will continue to exist for both states and professional athletes.
However, as opposed to the voluntariness of the states, congressional
intervention is an easier and more efficient manner to ensure a uniform
application method is reached.
Congressional intervention is the best method to determine and develop a
precise definition for duty-day. This congressional action would allow more
clarity to be provided and guarantee administration and enforcement of the jock
tax are less burdensome on both states and professional athletes. Also, Congress
can ensure every state’s jock tax conforms to the constitutional restrictions
involved with the taxation of nonresidents, thereby eliminating potential claims
and litigation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

States’ enforcement of the jock tax is not likely to disappear anytime soon.
The revenue received is too significant. Therefore, the states’ application and
enforcement efforts must be addressed. Because nonresident professional
athletes are unable to challenge a state’s jock tax until after it has been
implemented, there is often harm caused, and the available remedies are limited.
Thus, with congressional involvement, professional athletes and states will be
ensured that each state’s jock tax does not infringe upon the professional
athletes’ constitutionally protected rights.
Although the states implement the same allocation method to impose tax
liability against professional athletes, inconsistencies still exist because states
172. Martin J. Greenberg, McCutchen’s Pay Stub Sheds Light on Jock Tax and Jock Tax
Successfully Challenged in Cleveland, GREENBERG L. OFF.: SPORT$BIZ (July 1, 2015),
http://www.greenberglawoffice.com/mccutchens-pay-stub-sheds-light-on-jock-tax-and-jock-tax-successfully-challenged-in-cleveland/.
173. See Hume v. Limbach, 575 N.E.2d 150, 151 (Ohio 1991).
174. See id.
175. Greenberg, supra note 172.
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do not agree on what constitutes a “duty-day.” Further, the recent case law
produced from the Ohio Supreme Court illustrates cities are still utilizing the
games-played method. As a result, professional athletes are being subjected to
multiple allocation methods that could be inherently unconstitutional.
Therefore, congressional action is needed to correct the inconsistencies that
exist to ensure professional athletes’ constitutional rights are being protected.
Overall, professional athletes will still have the daunting task of
determining their tax liability for each state they visit. Nonetheless, Congress
can assist in alleviating this burden by developing a uniform allocation method
to be used by all states and cities that levy a jock tax. Especially since states
and cities have shown no sign of lessening their enforcement of the jock tax,
Congress should formulate a resolution as soon as feasibly possible.

